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Abstract
Company value can be increased by minimizing the cost of equity capital. The cost of
equity capital is the rate of return required by investors in accordance with company
condition. The purpose of this study was to analyze the influence of earning manage-
ment and asymmetry information on the cost of equity capital with disclosure level as
the moderating variable by presenting Company Size, Market Capitalization, Leverage,
and Profitability as the control variables. The population of the study was 148 manufac-
turing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange with the total unit of analysis
was 330. Then, hypotheses were analyzed with software Eviews 9. The results of the
study showed that earning management, asymmetry information, company size, profit-
ability, and disclosure level had significant influences on the cost of equity capital for
both large and small companies. Then, it also showed that disclosure level was able to
moderate the influence of earning management on the cost of equity capital, but it was
not able to moderate the influence of asymmetry information on the cost of equity
capital both large and small companies. It was interesting because the coefficients of
influence were different based on the company size. On small companies, the influence
of disclosure level on asymmetry information was negative.
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Abstrak
Nilai perusahaan dapat dinaikkan dengan cara meminimalkan biaya modal ekuitas. Biaya
modal ekuitas merupakan tingkat pengembalian yang disyaratkan oleh investor dengan
memperhatikan kondisi masing-masing perusahaan. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis
pengaruh manajemen laba dan asimetri informasi terhadap biaya modal ekuitas dengan
tingkat disclosure sebagai variabel moderasi dengan menghadirkan variabel Ukuran
Perusahaan, Market Capitalization, Leverage, dan Profitabilitas sebagai variabel kontrol.
Populasi penelitian sebanyak 148 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek
Indonesia dengan total unit analisis sejumlah 330. Pengujian Hipotesis dilakukan dengan
menggunakan software Eviews 9. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa manajemen laba,
asimetri informasi, ukuran perusahaan, profitabilitas, dan tingkat disclosure berpengaruh
signifikan terhadap biaya modal ekuitas baik perusahaan besar maupun kecil. Selain itu,
penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa tingkat disclosure mampu memoderasi pengaruh
manajemen laba terhadap biaya modal ekuitas, namun tidak mampu memodersi pengaruh
asismetri informasi terhadap biaya modal ekuitas baik perusahaan besar maupun kecil.
Selanjutnya, hasil penelitian ini menarik, karena dari pengujian terhadap besar kecilnya
perusahaan menunjukkan hasil yang berbeda koefisien pengaruhnya. Dimana perusahaan
kecil, dengan hadirnya tingkat disclousure pengaruh asimetri informasi adalah negatif.
Kata kunci: Asimetri Informasi, Biaya Modal Ekuitas, Tingkat Disclosure; Manajemen Laba
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1. Introduction
The capital market is an effective means to at-
tract funds from the community (Gitosudarmo &
Basri, 2013). Scrolling the capital from investors helps
the company survive and expand the business. There
are two perspectives on capital embedded in the com-
pany. First, the investor assumes capital as an invest-
ment to get the desired profit. Second, the company
views capital as an equity debt which should be re-
turned to the investors. This study highlights the cost
of equity capital issued by companies.
Beneda (2003), Pagano & Stout (2004), Zorn
(2007), and Embong, Mohd-saleh, & Hassan (2012),
said that equity cost was equal to the rate of return
required by investors. Investors usually request the re-
quired rate of return based on company conditions.
The high rate of profit is a form of investor anticipa-
tion of the company’s high risk. It is a form of com-
pany inefficiency in managing the cost of equity capi-
tal issued.
Company value is maximized by minimizing the
company’s cost of equity capital. Low the cost of eq-
uity capital reflects its low risk which makes the share-
holders assume if the company’s value is high. How-
ever, the fact shows that the cost of equity capital has
increased every year. It can be seen in Table 1.
The above data showed that the average com-
pany experienced an increase in the cost of equity capi-
tal each year. It proved that there was an increase in
the company risk which followed by the increase in
the cost of equity capital. Nurjanati & Rodoni (2015)
stated that this condition referred to a review of today’s
Indonesian economy that the high cost of capital in a
company would have a major impact on investment.
It is in line with Beyer et al. (2010) which stated that
information quality had a significant influence on the
cost of equity capital. It makes companies tend to re-
frain from conducting public offerings and fundraising
activities. It affects the company’s activities due to lack
of capital. Consequently, the company is unable to
compete when it experiences capital difficulties, and
it makes capital cost negative.
The phenomenon in 2008 made the company
get problems in obtaining funding sources. The eco-
nomic crisis in 2008 was a phenomenon which blew
hard Indonesian business people. The indirect impact
was the weakening of global demand which was mani-
fested in the form of a decline in world commodity
prices and a decline in export demand (Sugema, 2012).
The falling export demand influenced the profitabil-
ity generated by the company. When profitability de-
creases, investors see the company as an unprofitable
destination which ultimately reducing the funding.
There were many studies on the influence of
earnings management and asymmetry information on
the cost of equity capital with inconsistent study re-
sults. Jumirin (2011) and O’Callaghan, Ashton, &
Hodgkinson (2018) stated that the higher the earn-
ings management, the higher the cost of equity capi-
tal. According to Kiswanto & Nurkhin (2013), man-
agement behavior which underlined earnings manage-
ment was manager’s opportunistic behavior. It hap-
pens because profit is an important benchmark for in-
vestors in deciding investments in the company. Thus;
the company regulates profits to attract the investors.
Then, Adriani (2013) stated that earnings man-
agement did not have any significant influence on the
cost of equity capital. Abnormal accrual rate was not
able to prove the influence of earnings management
on the cost of equity capital in this study. Those dif-
Years 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Average of CE -0.1942 -0.0232 -0.0549 -0.0036 
Increase (%)  -88.063 136.649 -93.455 
 
Table 1. The Increase Average of the Cost of Equity Capital at Manufacturing Companies
Source: Nurjanati & Rodoni (2015)
The Influence of Earnings Management and Asymmetry information ...
Kiswanto & Novi Fitriani
| 125 |
ferent research results showed that there were variables
that played a role in moderating the influence of earn-
ings management on the cost of equity capital.
The different study results happen in the influ-
ence of asymmetry information on the cost of equity
capital. Nuryaman (2014) and Hajawiyah, Adhariani,
& Djakman (2018) stated that asymmetry informa-
tion did not affect the cost of equity capital. It hap-
pened because investors could not read the positive
signals given by the company; it means that the infor-
mation of the company did not affect the return level
expected by investors (Ningsih & Ariani, 2016). The
same study results also happen to Ifonie’s research
(2012). He stated that the magnitude of asymmetry
information could not directly explain its influence
on the cost of equity capital.
However, Eid (2015) stated that asymmetry
information had a positive influence on the cost of
equity capital. Perwira & Darsono (2015) also stated
the same thing, and they claimed that the bid-ask
spread, which was adverse information, was a com-
ponent directly related to signaling. This signal would
influence shareholders to make decision raise or lower
rate of return which was the cost for the company.
But Nurjanati & Rodoni (2015) research found that
asymmetry information produced a negative influence
on the cost of equity capital. It happened on both
informed and less informed investors who reduced the
liquidity and ultimately it was negative in explaining
the influence of asymmetry information on the cost
of equity capital.
Those inconsistent results or the research gaps
provide opportunities for the researchers to present the
novelty of the research. The researcher presents a mod-
erating variable as a determinant to influence the in-
dependent variables on the dependent variable. The
moderating variable is the disclosure level. Disclosure
level is a comprehensive disclosure of information to
improve investors’ trust in the actual condition of the
company. The constraint which might happen between
the company and its investors is inadequate informa-
tion. Thus; more disclosure is needed to reduce the
company risk which can ultimately reduce the cost of
equity capital.
There were mandatory and voluntary disclosures
which helped investors understood the risks when they
invested funds into the company (Adriani, 2013). The
company made disclosures through financial and an-
nual reports. Nurjanati & Rodoni (2015) stated that
investors assumed risky financial reports if the finan-
cial reports did not provide adequate disclosure. The
investors’ views on a financial report made the rise or
the fall of the cost of equity capital.
The first objective of the study was to analyze
the direct influence of earnings management (earnings
management Jones model developed by Dechow, Soan,
& Sweeney, 1995) and asymmetry information on the
cost of equity capital. The modified Jones model for
earnings management was used because it was the most
appropriate model to measure the accrual earnings
management compared to other models (Suprianto &
Setiawan, 2017). Then, the second objective of the
research was to analyze the influence of earnings man-
agement and asymmetry information on the cost of
equity capital involving level disclosure variable. Dis-
closure level was the novelty of the research. Com-
pany size, market capitalization, leverage, and profit-
ability were the control variables to control the direct
and indirect influences of management and asymme-
try information on equity cost.
2. Hypotheses Development
The relationship between the company and
shareholders is explained by agency theory. Agency
theory explains that shareholders (principals) delegate
their interests to companies (agents) to increase the
prosperity of shareholders (principals). The relation-
ship can arise the interest conflict because both parties
(agents and principals) have different goals. The com-
pany wants high compensation for its performance,
and it also expects high profits.
The influence of earnings management on the
cost of equity capital is based on agency theory where
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the company management holds as an agent and share-
holders as the principals. Management automatically
has a broader knowledge of the company’s condition
than shareholders, and their actions are often unknown
by the shareholders. This gap allows management to
perform dysfunctional behavior. One of the dysfunc-
tional behaviors carried out by agents was manipulat-
ing data in financial statements to match the expecta-
tions of the principals although the report did not
describe the actual condition of the company (Rinobel
& Laksito, 2015).
The importance of a company’s profit infor-
mation makes some of the company’s management
manipulated the company’s actual profit information
(Risdawaty, 2015). Manipulation was done by adjust-
ing profits according to company goals. Utami (2005)
said that the motive of the company for creating earn-
ings management was to obtain external funding at a
low cost. It makes the investors ask for high returns
due to the manipulation performed by the company’s
management.
It is in line with Jumirin (2011) study’s which
stated that earnings management had a positive influ-
ence on the cost of equity capital. The higher the man-
agement in managing profit, the more shareholders
increase the required rate of return. Kim & Charlie
(2013) got the results that deviating earnings man-
agement could reduce the quality of profit informa-
tion used by investors. It made the market ask for high
premium risk where the additional premium risk was
focused on accrual earnings management activities.
Thus, the first hypothesis is:
H1: earnings management has a positive influence
on the cost of equity capital
Asymmetry information is information inequal-
ity between company management and shareholders.
Shareholders do not have any sufficient information
on the company’s prospects. It makes the company
considered as high risk. Therefore, transparent infor-
mation is needed by the information users, especially
shareholders as the owners, which the information can
be used as a basis for decision making (Indriani, 2013).
Companies with high asymmetry information
make a gap for themselves which consequently increases
the cost of equity capital. It is consistent with agency
theory; it states that the more information hidden by
the agent, the higher the risk borne by the sharehold-
ers, which in turn affects on the cost of equity capital
issued by the company (Nurjanati & Rodoni, 2015).
It is in accordance with the principle of high-risk, high
return.
Then, Purwanto (2012) showed that asymmetry
information had a positive influence on the cost of eq-
uity capital. It means that the more asymmetry infor-
mation, the more cost of equity capital issued by the
company and vice versa; the less asymmetry informa-
tion, the less cost of the company’s equity capital. The
measurement of asymmetry information was often
proxied by the bid-ask spread. Ifonie (2012) related to
the bid-ask spread, stated that the focus of the
accountant’s attention was on the adverse selection
component because it dealt by providing information
to the capital market. The second hypothesis is:
H2: asymmetry information has a positive influence
on the cost of equity capital
The role of disclosure level in moderating the
influence of earnings management on the cost of eq-
uity capital is based on signaling theory. Signaling
theory is a signal sending to investors regarding the
condition of the company. The management’s action
in earning managing can be a signal for investors to
get ready to face high company risk. Companies which
make earnings management make the disclosure role
as a prejudice reduction to the company. Disclosure
determines whether the shareholders can understand
the strategy carried out by the company for business
progress.
Disclosure is a signal to indicate that the com-
pany is in good condition and has good prospects to
maintain the returns given to investors. Companies
need to disclose a lot of information to attract share-
holders to continue investing their capital. Then, dis-
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closure plays an important role for the companies to
move in earning managing. This disclosure encourages
companies to conduct earnings management for both
business and management interests.
Khlif, Samaha, & Azzam (2015) in their research
proved that the disclosure level had a negative influ-
ence on the cost of equity capital. The higher disclo-
sure level, the lower cost of equity capital issued by
the company. Companies which provide a lot of dis-
closures encourage investors to keep investing in the
company. Disclosures made by the company indicate
that the company considers the continuity of the com-
pany and automatically the shareholders’ prosperity
can be fulfilled. Then, the third hypothesis is:
H3: disclosure level moderates the influence of earn-
ings management on the cost of equity capital
Signal theory describes the relationship of
asymmetry information and the cost of equity capital
involving disclosure. Signals are given by the company
which causes a market reaction according to the sig-
nal given. Disclosure is used as a signal by the com-
pany to convey the company’s condition and future
company image. The extent of disclosure is more at-
tractive for the investors because it can accurately pre-
dict the taken actions.
Unfulfilled disclosures make the high asym-
metry information. The direct influence felt by the
company is the high required rate of return (the cost
of equity capital). The increase happened as a result
of the high-risk assessment of the company by inves-
tors, thereby increasing the rate of return as a guaran-
tee of invested capital. Disclosures play an important
role in the relationship between asymmetry informa-
tion and the cost of equity capital.
Eid (2015) research’s produced a low regres-
sion coefficient. The role of disclosure level would in-
fluence asymmetry information on the cost of equity
capital. A broad disclosure level declined the influence
of asymmetry information on the cost of equity capi-
tal. Asymmetry information has a positive influence
on the cost of equity capital. When a company pro-
duces disclosure, it can increase or decrease the cost of
equity capital depending on the positive or negative
information. Then, the fourth hypothesis is:
H4: disclosure level moderates the influence of asym-
metry information on the cost of equity capital
3. Method, Data, and Analysis
This study used quantitative research with a de-
ductive approach. It used secondary data to test the
hypotheses. The population of the study was all manu-
facturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change from 2010-2015 consisting of 148 companies.
Furthermore, this study used purposive sampling with
the following sampling criteria showed in Table 2.
Selection Criteria 
Unselected 
Companies 
Total 
Manufacturing company on the IDX in 2010-2015  148 
Manufacturing companies listed on the IDX in 2010-2015 (14) 134 
Manufacturing companies publishing the annual reports and financial statements in 2010-2015 (25) 109 
Manufacturing companies use Indonesian Rupiah currency  (26) 83 
Manufacturing companies having a financial report on December 31 (1) 82 
Manufacturing companies having positive equity book values (7) 75 
Manufacturing company having complete data from 2010-2015 (19) 56 
Number of research samples  56 
Research Period  6 
Total of research data in 2010-2015  336 
Negative Equity Cost in 2010-2015 (6) 330 
Number of Unit Analysis  330 
 
Table 2. The Samples Selection
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Research 
Variable 
Operational definition Measurement 
The cost of 
equity capital 
(CEC) 
The cost of equity is the return (often 
expressed as a rate of return) a firm 
theoretically pays to its equity investors to 
compensate for the risk they undertake by 
investing their capital in the company (Eid, 
2015) 
Cost it = Rft + (Rmt – Rft) βit 
 
Notes: 
Cost it: the cost of equity capital in companies i and years t 
Rft: risk-free rate in a given year 
RMt: average market return for a given year 
Βit: beta coefficient of company shares in company i and 
year t 
(Khlif, Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) 
   
Earnings 
management 
(EM) 
Earnings management is an attempt by 
company managers to intervene and 
influence information in financial statements 
with the objective to trick stakeholders who 
want to know the performance and 
conditions of the company (Sulistyanto, 
2008). 
Modified Jones: 
 
 
Where: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DACC: discretionary accrual 
TACC: total accrual  
NDACC:non- discretionary accrual 
∆REV: revenue changes 
∆REC: net receivable  
∆CA: change in current assets 
∆Cash: change in cash and cash equivalent 
ΔCL: changes in current liabilities 
ΔDCL: change in short-term debt changes in current 
liabilities 
DEP: depreciation and amortization expenses  
PPE: gross property plant and equipment  
At-1: total previous year assets  
t: show the year now  
, , dan : parameter estimation (alpha) 
: t year residue value  
(Jones, 1991) developed by Dechow, Soan, & Sweeney 
(1995) 
   
Asymmetry 
Information 
(AI) 
Asymmetry Information is a condition where 
there is an imbalance in information 
acquisition between management as the 
information provider and the shareholders 
and stakeholders as the information users 
(Nurjanati & Rodoni, 2015) 
Spreadjt = {(askjt - bidjt)/ ((askjt + bidjt)/2)}x 100 
 
Notes: 
Askjt: the highest selling price of company j in year t 
Bidjt: the lowest buying price for company j in year t 
(Eid, 2015) 
   
Table 3. The Operational Definitions of the Variables
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Disclosure 
Level (DL) 
Information disclosure on the company. It is 
a voluntary corporate disclosure which 
consists of 12 parts and consists of 80 
indicators, they are general information 
about the company, company strategy, 
future prospects, information about the 
board of directors, information about 
operating procedure, information about 
products/ services, information about market 
segmentation, research and development; 
information about employees, information 
about environment and social affairs, review 
of financial statements; information related 
to the market (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2011; Khlif, Samaha, & 
Azzam, 2015).  
Disclosed total score/ should be a total score (Khlif, 
Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) 
   
Company Size 
(SIZE) 
Company size (Size) is a scale which can be 
classified by the size of the company 
according to various ways; e.g., based on 
total assets, sales, log size, stock market 
value, market capitalization, etc. All criteria 
are highly correlated. 
Dividend (Wijaya, 2017) 
Size= Log Total Asset (Ln_Total Asset) 
 
   
Market 
Capitalization 
(MC) 
Company market capitalization value (Khlif, 
Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) 
Natural Logarithm Market capitalization (Share price 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares) 
   
Leverage 
(LEV) 
Comparison between obligations and capital 
(Khlif, Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) 
 
Debt to equity ratio 
Profitability 
(PROF) 
Comparison between net income and capital 
Book Value (Khlif, Samaha, & Azzam, 2015) 
Value of ROE (return on equity) ratio 
 
This study consists of independent, moderating,
and dependent variables which are explained in Table
3.
Data were taken from annual reports, Pefindo,
and Indonesian Premium Risk Market (www.market-
risk-premium). The panel data are then tested using
E-views software series 9. Therefore, the hypothesis
testing of this study expressed in the following math-
ematical equations:
CEC it =  + 1EM1it + 2AI2it + 3SIZE3it +
4MC4it + 5LEV5it + 6PROF6it + eit  (1)
CECit =  + 1EM1it + 2AI2it + 3EM*DLit +

4
AI*DL
4it 
+ 
5
SIZE5it + 6MC6it + 7LEV7it
+ 8PROF8it + 8DL8it eit (2)
Notes:
CEC : the cost of equity capital
EM : earnings management
AI : asymmetry information
DL : disclosure level
EM * DL : interaction between earnings management
and disclosure Level
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AI * DL : interaction between asymmetry informa-
tion and disclosure level
Size : company size (ln total assets)
MC : market capitalization (ln market capitali-
zation)
LEV : leverage (debt to equity ratio)
PROF : profitability (return on equity)
B
1-8
: the coefficient of each variable
I : entity for i
t : period for t
e : error
Furthermore, for having the robustness test, the
analysis of hypotheses testing was done in two stages.
First, hypotheses testing were carried out on all re-
search samples. Second, hypotheses testing were done
by separating samples based on company categories,
large and small companies.
1. Results
The descriptive statistics of each of these research
variables are presented in Table 4.
The descriptive statistical results on the cost of
equity capital variable (Y) indicate that the minimum
value was 0.0006807, the maximum value was
117.8625, and the average value was 28.54586 with
a standard deviation was 20.14996 from the average
value. The high cost of equity capital was a form of
company inefficiency in managing costs for getting
funds from external companies. The high capital cost
represented a high company risk, so shareholders also
requested high returns. Companies needed to provide
disclosure information to reduce high-risk assessment
from the shareholders.
Then, Earnings management had the minimum
value -0.301075, the maximum value 92.68290, and
the average value 1.205901. The value of earnings
management accruals was less than zero (0); it indi-
cates that earnings management was to minimize the
profits. Small profits occurred due to the deferred tax
burden on the previous period, so the company must
pay taxes in two periods at once.
Next, Asymmetry Information highlighting the
interaction between companies and shareholders was
proxied by the bid/ask spread. The result shows the
average value is 3.669317; it means that it was high
asymmetry information every year. The company knew
more or dominated the information of the company
rather than investors. The distribution of asymmetry
information was shown in the standard deviation value
at 1.861454. Whereas, the average values for all con-
trol variables were 1.995699 for Company Size,
14.05255 for Market Capitalization, 1.091118 for
leverage, and 16.10184 for Profitability.
Disclosure level of this study was proxied with
the sum expressed by the company compared to the
total which should be disclosed. The average value of
disclosure level was 0.498840 with a standard devia-
tion 0.187189. It shows that the disclosure level was
relatively low. The disclosure was very important for
companies to provide information which happened
in the company for shareholders. Then, shareholders
could use this important information in decision mak-
ing.
Furthermore, before testing the research hypoth-
esis, it is necessary to do a classic assumption test con-
sisting of normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity,
and autocorrelation. The results of classical assumption
testing are done to ensure that the data can be used in
hypotheses testing. Based on the test results, it indicates
that the data meets the classical assumption requirements.
The normality test shows that the value of Jarque-Bera is
 CEC EM AI SIZE MC LEV PROF DL 
 Mean  28.54586  1.205901  3.669317  1.995699  14.05255  1.091118  16.10184  0.498840
 Maximum  117.8625  92.68290  5.196268  4.865372  19.73590  11.25000  125.8100  0.991524
 Minimum  0.0006807 -0.301075 -15.05854  0.106165  9.721966  0.020000  0.010000  0.012264
 Std. Dev.  20.14996  8.693936  1.861454  0.939558  2.448309  1.252424  16.81039  0.187189
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
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843.5296 with a probability value of 0.342331; it means
that data have a normal distribution. Then, for
multicollinearity test, there is not any influence among
research variables. When the correlation value among
variables above 0.90, it means that there was not any
multicollinearity in this research model. Next, for the
autocorrelation test, it showed that the value of Durbin-
Watson is 2.022163. It means that the data of this study
were not subject to autocorrelation because the DW value
is between du and 4-dU (1.831 < 2.022 < 2.169). The
last, for heteroscedasticity test, it showed that the test
chart did not show any particular movement pattern;
then, the data of this study were not exposed to have
any heteroscedasticity.
Furthermore, after analyzing with classical as-
sumption tests, the data can be used in hypotheses test-
ing. Hypothesis testings were divided into two stages
— first, hypothesis testing on the whole unit of analy-
sis (large and small companies). Second, testing on two
categorized companies, large and small companies. The
hypotheses testings carried out in two stages were in-
tended to compare whether there were differences in
results between the testing of the entire unit of analy-
sis with those separated between small and large com-
panies. Furthermore, the results of hypothesis testing
are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 is a hypothesis testing for all units of
analysis combining small and large companies. The
test results showed that earnings management and
asymmetry information influenced the cost of equity
capital. However, after interacting with earnings man-
agement and information assets at the disclosure level,
only earnings management was able to show its influ-
ence on the cost of equity capital. It showed that the
disclosure level was able to moderate the influence of
earnings management on equity cost for all categories
of companies (sig.= 0.000). However, the disclosure
level was not able to moderate the influence of asym-
metry information on equity cost for all company cat-
egories (sig.= 0.4151).
And here it is the results of hypotheses testing
by distinguishing large and small companies (Table 6).
Before the Moderating Variable After Added the Moderating Variable 
Var. Coefficient t-Stat Prob. Con. Var. Coefficient t-Stat Prob. Con. 
C -5.468057 -0.750534 0.4535  C -35.13691 -5.529904 0.0000  
EM 
0.228209 
1.255344 0.2103 
Rejected 
EM 3.860004 6.656022 0.0000 
H1: 
Accepted 
AI 
4.599425 
5.449497 0.0000 
Accepted 
AI 7.533769 9.591968 0.0000 
H2: 
Accepted 
SIZE 6.841111 6.430713 0.0000 Accepted SIZE 4.037056 3.536409 0.0005 Accepted 
MC 0.062358 0.133964 0.8935 Rejected MC -0.100570 -0.274974 0.7835 Rejected 
LEV -0.538111 -0.675202 0.5000 Rejected LEV -0.272996 -0.436071 0.6631 Rejected 
PROF 0.180724 2.735089 0.0066 Accepted PROF 0.183450 3.534187 0.0005 Accepted 
     DL 55.50565 12.59598 0.0000 Accepted 
  
  
EMDL -5.293327 -6.461243 0.0000 
H3: 
Accepted 
    AIDL -0.723571 -0.816017 0.4151 H4: Rejected 
         
R-squared 0.261197   R-squared 0.549074   
Adjusted R-squared 0.247473   Adjusted R-squared 0.536392   
S.E. of regression 17.49510   S.E. of regression 13.73191   
F-statistic 19.03226   F-statistic 43.29451   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Mean dependent var 28.58547 
  Mean dependent 
var 28.58547 
  
S.D. dependent var 20.16765   S.D. dependent var 20.16765   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.103324   Durbin-Watson stat 2.178387   
 
Table 5. The Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results for All Study Samples (Small and Large Companies)
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Table 6 showed that earnings management and
asymmetry information influenced the cost of equity
capital for small companies after adding a moderat-
ing variable on the model. The relationship between
earnings management and disclosure level was also
accepted. This shows that the disclosure level was able
to moderate the influence of earnings management on
the cost of equity capital for small companies with
significance was 0.0441. However, the disclosure level
was not able to moderate the influence of asymmetry
information on the cost of equity because significance
was 0.5830. Next, to prove that these results did not
only apply to small companies but also on large com-
panies; the large companies’ analysis results can be seen
in Table 7.
The results of hypothesis testing on large com-
panies showed that: earnings management and asym-
metry information influenced the cost of equity capi-
tal for large companies because significance was 0.0000.
It also happened on disclosure level; it was able to
prove as a moderating variable to influence earnings
management on the cost of equity capital since sig-
nificance was 0.0325, but it was not able to moderate
the influence asymmetry information on the cost of
equity capital because the significance was 0.9969. The
results of hypotheses testing on large companies were
similar to small companies.
Based on two steps of hypotheses testing above,
it showed that earnings management and asymmetry
information could directly influence the cost of eq-
uity capital. This means that this research model was
appropriate to prove that the cost of equity capital
was influenced by earnings management and asym-
metry information for both small and large compa-
nies. In other words, earnings management and asym-
metry information influenced the cost of the equity
Before the Moderating Variable After Added the Moderating Variable 
Var. Coeff. t-Stat Prob. Concl. Var. Coeff. t-Stat Prob. Concl. 
C -1.009521 -0.132201 0.8950  C -20.52228 -2.660668 0.0086  
EM 0.799728 3.127381 0.0021 Accepted ML 6.149753 2.361887 0.0194 H1:Accepted 
AI 4.729649 5.305719 0.0000 Accepted AI 5.724720 7.740606 0.0000 H2:Accepted 
MC 0.327534 0.651419 0.5157 Rejected MC -0.219965 -0.550276 0.5829 Rejected 
LEV 0.183493 0.229829 0.8185 Rejected LEV -0.114065 -0.181210 0.8564 Rejected 
PROF 0.093619 1.177439 0.2408 Rejected PROF 0.161964 2.550639 0.0117 Accepted 
     DL 56.33569 8.432428 0.0000 Accepted 
     EMDL -10.49406 -2.029600 0.0441 H4: Rejected 
     AIDL -0.701807 -0.550182 0.5830 H3: 
Accepted 
          
          
R-squared 0.215371   R-squared 0.523136    
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.190223   Adjusted R-squared 0.498202    
S.E. of 
regression 
13.77173   S.E. of regression 10.84102    
F-statistic 8.564019   F-statistic 20.98081    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Mean 
dependent var 
22.88347   Mean dependent var 22.88347    
S.D. dependent 
var 
15.30402   S.D. dependent var 15.30402    
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.944744   Durbin-Watson stat 2.111401    
 
Table 6. Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results on Small Companies
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capital, without seeing the company categorized as a
small or a large company.
The next results showed that disclosure level was
able to moderate the influence earnings management
on the cost of equity capital both for large and small
companies. However, the disclosure level was not able
to moderate the influence of asymmetry information
on the cost of equity capital. These results mean that
this research model was appropriate for analyzing all
types of companies, both large and small companies.
2. Discussion
The influence of earnings management on the
cost of equity capital
The study showed that earnings management
had a significant positive influence on the cost of eq-
uity capital both for all companies and after being
separated between small and large companies. Then,
the alternative hypothesis which stated that earnings
management had a positive influence on the cost of
equity capital was accepted. The acceptance of the
hypothesis of this research implied that this research
model could be used for all categories of companies,
Before the Moderating Variable After Added the Moderating Variable 
Var. Coeff. t-stat Prob. Concl. Var. Coeff. t-stat Prob. Concl. 
C -82.31078 -6.023599 0.0000  C -119.0926 -11.86739 0.0000 H1:Accepted 
EM 2.027716 7.368222 0.0000 Accepted EM 3.618897 4.455872 0.0000 H2:Accepted 
AI 28.15316 11.06584 0.0000 Accepted AI 28.64740 15.63316 0.0000 Rejected 
MC 0.386733 0.586902 0.5581 Rejected MC 0.358672 0.774108 0.4400 Rejected 
LEV -1.235762 -0.995906 0.3208 Rejected LEV -0.429264 -0.491509 0.6237 Accepted 
PROF 0.115554 1.361997 0.1751 Rejected PROF 0.121542 2.038096 0.0432 Accepted 
     DL 60.49399 12.95808 0.0000 H3: Accepted 
    EMDL -2.351663 -2.156747 0.0325 H3: Accepted 
    AIDL 0.002974 0.003890 0.9969 H4: Accepted 
         
R-squared 0.468380   R-squared 0.742878   
Adjusted R-squared 0.451972   Adjusted R-squared 0.729941   
S.E. of regression 16.77599   S.E. of regression 11.77650   
F-statistic 28.54583   F-statistic 57.42300   
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000   
Mean dependent var 34.08383   Mean dependent var 34.08383   
S.D. dependent var 22.66142   S.D. dependent var 22.66142   
Durbin-Watson stat 1.725905   Durbin-Watson stat 1.762738   
 
Table 7. Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results on Large Companies
so this model is appropriate for analyzing companies
with small categories and large companies.
Then, the results of this study indicated that
management was more likely to behave to do earnings
management to pursue a lower cost of equity which
impressed for having better company’s performance.
It is in line with Rinobel & Laksito (2015), they stated
that one of the dysfunctional behaviors carried out by
the agents was manipulating data in financial state-
ments to match the principals’ expectations although
the report did not describe the actual condition of the
company.
The results of this study were in accordance with
agency theory which explained that the management
and shareholders had their conflicts of interest. Share-
holders would certainly oppose the management con-
ducting high earnings management because it was con-
sidered to provide information which did not reflect
the actual condition of the company. Earnings man-
agement used because it increased the cost of equity
capital as a form of risk faced by shareholders.
O’Callaghan, Ashton, & Hodgkinson (2018)
said that the accrual component in profit was a source
of uncertainty which could reduce profit capability in
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projecting future cash flows. Earnings management has
an accrual element which is the cause of uncertainty.
It involves assumptions and approaches from the per-
spective of management. The element of management’s
subjectivity in policy-making can increase investors’
uncertainty over investment risks.
Then, Stolowy & Breton (2004) explained that
account manipulation was solely done based on
management’s desire to influence investors’ perceptions
of company risk, i.e., the risk of yield variation and
the company risk’s financial structure. It made inves-
tors ask for high returns due to the manipulation by
the management of the company. It is in line with the
research results conducted by Jumirin (2011) and
O’Callaghan, Ashton, & Hodgkinson (2018), they
found that earnings management had a positive in-
fluence on the cost of equity capital. The higher man-
agement in earnings management, the more sharehold-
ers increase the required rate of return.
Influence of asymmetry information on the
cost of equity capital
The results showed that asymmetry information
had a significant positive influence on the cost of eq-
uity capital both for all companies and after being
separated between small and large companies. This
result is in line with agency theory which states the
relationship between asymmetry information and the
cost of equity capital. The management who acts as
an agent has complete information on the company’s
condition and its prospects. On the other hand, the
shareholders (principals) only know the condition of
the company at a glance. This difference in informa-
tion can lead to asymmetry information. The relation-
ship between agent and principal can have problems if
there is asymmetric information (Rinobel & Laksito,
2015; Hajawiyah, Adhariani, & Djakman, 2018).
Shareholders who did not have any adequate
information on the company’s prospects assume that
the company was at high risk. As the shareholders,
they did not want to get big loss due to the high com-
pany risk. Shareholders would increase the cost of eq-
uity capital as a condition for returning the capital
invested. It means that companies with a high level of
asymmetry information would make a gap for them-
selves because it automatically increased the cost of
equity capital. This was consistent with agency theory;
the more information hidden by the agent, the higher
the risk borne by the capital owner or shareholder,
which in turn impacted on the cost of equity capital
issued by the company (Nurjanati & Rodoni, 2015).
Ifonie (2012), Purwanto (2012), and Nuryaman
(2014) found that asymmetry information had a posi-
tive influence on the cost of equity capital. It means
that the more asymmetry information, the more cost
of equity capital issued by the company and vice versa;
the less asymmetry information, the less the cost of
equity capital. The measurement of asymmetry infor-
mation is often proxied by bid-ask spread.
Disclosure level moderates the influence of
earnings management on the cost of equity
capital
The study showed that the disclosure level was
able to be a moderating role for the influence of earn-
ings management on the cost of equity capital both
for all companies and after being separated between
small and large companies. The third hypothesis of
this study was accepted. It means that the disclosure
level was a moderating variable for earnings manage-
ment and the cost of equity capital issued by the com-
pany. Information disclosed by the company can in-
fluence the decisions of shareholders to reduce the rate
of return (the cost of equity capital). It indicates that
the cost of delivering information is in accordance with
the benefits obtained by the company to reduce the
cost of equity capital.
These results are in accordance with signaling
theory which states that any information is a signal to
shareholders that can affect company funding (Beyer
et al., 2010; Appuhami, 2018). The signal given by
the company encourages shareholders to reduce the
rate of return (costs for the company) is not proven.
Disclosure level is able to be a determinant in strength-
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ening or weakening the influence of earnings manage-
ment on the cost of equity capital.
Every disclosure provided by the company shows
the company’s transparency on information. Compa-
nies which utilize normal accruals on their financial
statements are deemed reasonable by shareholders.
Normal accrual is one of management’s efforts in earn-
ings management through an accounting method
which can provide indirect benefits to the company.
Disclosure level moderating the influences of
asymmetry information on the cost of equity
capital
The study was unable to prove that the disclo-
sure level has a role in moderating the influence of
asymmetry information on the cost of equity capital
both for all companies and after being separated be-
tween small and large companies. Although the result
is not significant the coefficient of influence was nega-
tive. It shows that any information disclosed by the
company can reduce asymmetry information between
the company and its shareholders. Shareholders’ un-
derstanding of the condition of the company can re-
duce the company risk which decreases the cost of eq-
uity capital (rate of return). The result of this study is
interesting because the influence coefficient is differ-
ent for large and small companies. For small compa-
nies, disclosure level moderates negatively on asym-
metry information.
Disclosure level in small companies would re-
duce asymmetry information which would ultimately
reduce the cost of equity capital. Thus, for small com-
panies; the disclosure level was very important as a
medium or a way to reduce the cost of equity capital.
Furthermore, if the company was not able to provide
adequate information through disclosure level, the cost
of equity capital became high. But this condition did
not apply to large companies especially if the com-
pany had a large asset and a good reputation.
The results of this study can be explained in the
signaling theory, which each disclosure is a signal to
shareholders. This signal can reduce asymmetry infor-
mation between companies and shareholders so it will
reduce the cost of equity capital. The companies which
make high disclosures tend to get respect from share-
holders. The clear condition of the company provides
an understanding of how shareholders must act so the
company can increase its company value from the
shareholders’ perspective. It reduces the company risk
from the perspective of shareholders which decreases
the cost of equity capital.
Embong, Mohd-saleh, & Hassan (2012) also
found that disclosure had a negative influence on the
cost of equity capital. Companies which disclose more
information can reduce the cost of equity capital. In-
formation disclosure encourages shareholders to im-
prove trust in the company further. It makes the com-
pany reduce the cost of equity capital when more in-
formation is revealed.
Disclosure level had an important role as a mod-
erating variable because any information provided by
a company through disclosure had an impact on the
company’s risk. The high company’s risk made the
company provide high return requested by the share-
holders. This was an inefficiency in expenditure. In
reducing these expenditure costs, the company’s man-
agement should make a disclosure which was in line
with the shareholders’ thoughts. The assessment of
future’s company was important for each party since
the disclosure reduced inefficiency in expenditure.
Companies with long-term vision should begin
repairing the information. Every disclosure is the
company’s step to gain long-term trust to maintain
the company’s sustainability in the future. Compa-
nies form shareholder perceptions as part of the
company’s efforts to minimize the cost of equity capi-
tal. The presence of disclosures from companies also
reduces asymmetry information. Information align-
ment makes stakeholders understand the condition of
the company. Thus, the company can get external fund-
ing for business expansion without any more ques-
tions.
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3. Conclusion, Limitations, and Suggestions
Conclusion
The study gave the empirical evidence which
examined the cost of equity capital in Indonesia. The
magnitude of the cost of equity capital was proven to
be influenced by earnings management and asymme-
try information for both large and small companies.
The influence of earnings management and asymme-
try information has increased with the company’s dis-
closure level. The increase can be seen from the direc-
tion of the influence coefficient on the negative num-
ber; it means that disclosure of information is able to
reduce the cost of equity capital. Therefore, the model
and results of this study can support references which
examine the cost of equity capital in Indonesia, and it
can be implemented in other industrial sectors.
Limitations and suggestions
However, there is a limitation of the study; it is
on the sample used of the study is only limited to
manufacturing companies. Therefore; for future re-
search, it can expand the sample by adding other in-
dustrial sectors; such as banking sectors, and or other
financial institutions since they also require funding
from other large companies.
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